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I. PREMISE 
Any democratic judicial system must be built on the principle of due 
process, the fountain from which all procedural rules and doctrines 
flourish.  The principle carries with it the ideas of fairness, reasonableness, 
and efficiency, all to be measured, balanced, and applied to the various, 
changing circumstances that confront a judicial system in a democracy. 
The idea of balance is essential to due process.  As Justice Harlan 
observed: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can 
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of 
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that 
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of 
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a 
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have 
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The 
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, 
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which 
it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That 
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically 
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which 
builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could 
serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.1 
What Justice Harlan said more than half a century ago is still true 
today.  Due process has not been codified and cannot be reduced to a one-
size-fit-all formula.  Rather, it calls for a careful consideration of a range 
of factors pertaining to fairness and reasonableness, and a careful 
balancing among the various conflicting interests of the parties and 
institutions directly and indirectly involved. 
Understanding the scope and contours of due process is thus crucial 
to the development of procedural and substantive rules that could achieve 
the optimal results in a democratic system. Yet the scholarly articles 
entirely devoted to the topic are scarce to say the least,2 and most of the 
                                                                                                             
 1 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment 
could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought 
is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for 
inanimate machines and not for judges”). 
 2 See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993). 
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relevant monographs3 have not articulated a theory of due process, but 
largely provide an historical overview or a survey of the rights that are 
commonly understood as due process rights. 
A theory of due process is missing and this deficiency has, in my 
opinion, contributed to the lack of a true understanding and, thus, truthful, 
real investment of the system in the principle. 
An article cannot do justice to the complexities and depth of the due 
process principle.  But there are some ideas and insights I thought I might 
share here, to start defining the theory of procedural due process, and 
prompt deeper judicial investigation and scholarship on the topic. 
I want to emphasize at the outset that my study focuses on civil 
procedural due process only, that is, it focuses only on the principle to 
which civil procedure rules and doctrines should conform to avoid unfair 
and unreasonable deprivations of liberty or property. 
Even if I believe that the fairness and reasonableness that the due 
process principle aims to achieve do not inherently demand any artificial 
separation between substantive and procedural law,4 I will limit myself to 
articulating a theory of procedural due process, given that my area of 
expertise is procedural law.  I am confident, though, that the theory here 
articulated will offer valuable support to those interested in exploring more 
deeply the idea of substantive due process and that, when applied to 
substantive due process, this theory will not require significant alterations. 
Part II of my study unearths the core of procedural due process 
through the relevant U.S. Supreme Court opinions and commentaries on 
the topic.  Part III tests some procedural rules and doctrines against the 
theory as articulated in Part II, showing where those rules and doctrines 
are not truthful to due process.  The due process theory is here revisited in 
view of this part’s findings.  Part IV shows how the procedural rules and 
                                                                                                             
 3 See, e.g., SULLIVAN MASSARO, THE ARCH OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2013); JOHN V ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 
(2003); ALFRED THOMPSON DENNING, BARON, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW (2003); VIRGINIA 
WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1932-1949: THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL (1972); RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL 
AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS 
IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE LAND” (1926); TAYLOR HANNIS, 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS: A TREATISE BASED, IN 
THE MAIN, ON THE BASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS 
GRANTED OR DENIED RELIEF UPON THE ONE GROUND OR THE OTHER (1917); LUCIUS POLK 
MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906). 
 4 However, concurring in Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 772 
(2005), Justice Souter suggested that collapsing substantive law and procedure would be 
inappropriate (Gonzales’s claim would thus take us beyond Roth or any other recognized 
theory of Fourteenth Amendment due process, by collapsing the distinction between 
property protected and the process that protects it.”). 
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doctrines examined in Part III affect the development of substantive law.  
And Part V offers my concluding remarks. 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
I’ll start from the basics.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution provide, respectively, that the federal government 
and the states shall not deprive any individual of life, liberty, or property 
without “due process of law.”  A law whose content impairs a liberty or 
property interest without a sufficient reason or justification will violate 
substantive due process rights.  A law that is enforced through an unfair 
process that impairs a liberty or property interest will violate procedural 
due process rights.5  In other words, a substantive law or procedural law 
that is not supported by logic, fairness, and efficiency considerations, one 
that has no reason other than to deprive the individual of life, liberty, or 
property, one that doesn’t serve any individual or societal interest, violates 
due process. 
Viewed in these terms, there seems to be no meaningful distinction 
between procedural and substantive due process.  And, in fact, no such 
distinction originally defined due process. The distinction was rather a 
product of that separation of procedure and substantive law that came with 
the demise of the original writs and forms of action6 and, more generally, 
with civilization and the development of a substantive law that was finally 
able to stand on its own footing.7 
Originally the plaintiff’s claim was probably conceived just as a 
component of the procedure, the process within which substantive law 
                                                                                                             
 5 See ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER MAY, AND SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 175 (7th ed. 2016). 
 6 THEODORE F. T. PLUCHNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 5th ed., at 
381–82 (1956). 
 7 See id., at 381. Pluchnett observed that the “power to think of law apart from its 
procedure . . . naturally can only develop when civilization has reached a mature stage” 
and that this doesn’t happen if “the law [is] not yet strong enough to stand alone, for 
obscurity rather than clarity.” Id. The “first comprehensive attempt to state (as far as was 
then possible) the whole of English law in the form of substantive rules” came with the 
Blackstone’s commentaries. Id. 
Pluchnett added that 
[t]he procedure was still there, however; in fact, the law was still entangled in 
it, and Blackstone’s venture could be plausibly dismissed by conservatives as 
a mere literary device. In the course of the succeeding century the great 
revolution took place. With the abolition of forms of action and the unification 
of courts and procedure, it became possible for law to flow more freely and 
to escape the confinement of the old procedural categories. Only then did it 
become possible to consider the law in practice as being the application of 
substantive, rather than procedural, rules. 
Id. at 382. 
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develops.  It then became clear that procedure was “a means to an end,”8 
the end of enforcing substantive rights, and a science of procedure 
developed to identify “the quickest, cheapest and most reliable methods of 
organizing the practice side of the law,”9 that is, dispute-resolution 
methods that would be consistent with due process. 
The science of procedure has progressed over the years.  And yet 
sometimes procedural rules and doctrines disserve logic and the 
democratic aspirations, and they don’t offer the quickest, cheapest, and 
most reliable means and methods of enforcing substantive rights. 
I have written about some of those rules and doctrines and, there, 
have complained about their flaws,10 attributing such flaws to a 
mechanical, check-list type of drafting and/or interpretation, as well as to 
case management concerns dominating and ultimately infecting the 
analysis.  The legislature and the federal judiciary, though, seem to 
welcome the mechanical/check-list approach as a method that provides 
guidance, and they do not necessarily attribute their choices to workload 
concerns. 
It is sometimes hard to identify the reasons behind specific legislative 
or judicial choices of analysis or outcomes that disserve due process and 
democracy.11  We scholars make hypotheses, assumptions.  Why, for 
example, are Rules 2312 and 2613 written in a code/check-list style which 
makes them so different from the other Rules?  Why did the Gunn14 Court 
find that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s 
malpractice claim arising out of patent law?  Why did the McIntyre15 Court 
find that there was no personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim who 
had been injured by the defendant’s machine sold to a resident of the forum 
state?  Why did the Linda R.S.16 Court or the Clapper17 Court find that the 
plaintiffs in both cases had no standing?  Why did the Iqbal18 Court find 
                                                                                                             
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., Simona Grossi, The Claim, __ HOUS. L. REV. __ (2017); Frontloading, 
Class Actions, and a Proposal for a New Rule 23, __LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. __ (2017); 
Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617 (2014); 
Forum Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2013); A 
Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising Under Jurisdiction, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 11 Simona Grossi, The Courts and the People, _NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE _  (2017). 
 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 13 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 14 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 15 J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 16 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
 17 Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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that the plaintiff’s claim of unlawful intentional discrimination against 
federal officials was not plausible? 
We speculate.  We make hypotheses.  The code/check-list style of 
Rule 23 might be intended to provide more guidance to judges and 
lawyers, to help them cope with the complexities of modern class actions.  
Or perhaps it might be intended to restrain judicial discretion—the more 
items to check on a list, the less room for judicial discretion and case-by-
case assessment of the needs of the case.19  Analogous hypotheses could 
be made for Rule 26, and one could add that the check-list approach is 
there intended to contain the breadth and costs of discovery.20 
As for the judicial opinions, it might have been case management 
concerns that led the Gunn Court to find no subject matter jurisdiction in 
that case.21  It was perhaps comity concerns and concerns for international 
relations that suggested the McIntyre outcome.22  Federalism concerns 
might have led to the standing analysis in Linda R.S.23  In Clapper, the 
outcome might have been generated by the “special framework”24 of the 
national security context.  And it was 9/11 that suggested the adoption of 
a strict pleading approach in Iqbal, one that would apply across a wide 
range of cases, though, not just to sensitive national security cases.25 
But what if instead of, or in addition to the above political reasons, 
some of the above legislative and judicial choices had been caused by a 
misunderstanding of the principle of due process and its true content?  
What if the legislature and federal judges were genuinely trying to draft 
rules and offer interpretations that they considered in service of the fair 
and efficient administration of justice?  What if the problem was to be 
attributed to a misunderstanding of due process and the balance of 
conflicting interests and needs that the principle requires?  I did consider 
the possibility that mine was just an exorbitant hypothesis.  Of course, 
everyone knows what due process is.  Everyone should know what it is 
and what it entails. 
This thought has essentially kept me from writing this article for 
several years. And yet I never abandoned the idea. I continued to observe, 
read the signals, ponder. 
My audience sometimes resisted when I described the plaintiffs’ 
right to have access to justice and the plaintiff’s reliance on the availability 
                                                                                                             
 19 Simona Grossi, Frontloading, supra note 10. 
 20 Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra note 10. 
 21 Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory, supra note 10. 
 22 Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 10. 
 23 Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra note 10. 
 24 Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
 25 Id. 
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of a forum as due process rights.  The plaintiffs’ due process rights are 
more clearly identifiable when we talk about class actions and absent 
plaintiffs that might be bound by a judgment to the rendition of which they 
have not participated.26  But those rights become less evident when we talk 
about personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, justiciability, 
abstention, pleadings, discovery, etc.  It is the defendant who is dragged 
into court.  The defendant is the one we need to take care of.  But what 
about the plaintiff?27  Where does the plaintiff stand in the analysis?  
Doesn’t due process demand consideration of the plaintiff’s rights too?  
The plaintiff’s reliance and expectations?  And how should we balance the 
conflicting interests?  Would formalism (law discovery) or realism (law 
creation), or a combination of the two, serve due process better?  If it’s a 
combination, a balance of the two and the conflicting interests at stake, 
how should we balance? 
This journey into procedural due process is intended to help in 
answering the above questions. It will shed more light into the content and 
contours of the principle, suggest a method to draw the optimal balance 
between the conflicting interests at stake, and ultimately develop a theory 
of procedural due process against which to assess procedural rules and 
doctrines. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the 
principle of due process.  In Kerry v. Din,28 the Court noted that 
[t]he Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna Carta. As 
originally drafted, the Great Charter provided that “[n]o freeman 
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or 
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any 
otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn 
                                                                                                             
 26 The mechanisms of Rule 23 are intended, among other things, to protect those very 
rights. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:5 (5th ed. 2014) (“Rule 23 is construed to 
ensure that the representative nature of class action litigation safeguards these absent class 
members’ due process rights.”). 
 27 As Frank I. Michelman noted, 
a denial of fair procedure to a civil plaintiff comes within the traditional due 
process concern about injurious treatment of individuals by the state, just 
insofar as we see the state’s failure to protect the plaintiff’s interests against 
the defendant’s encroachments as itself a form of injury. Such is the SOCIAL 
COMPACT view according to which persons entering political association 
surrender to the state the use of force, for the safer protection of their several 
“lives, liberties, and estates.” The state’s regime of law and order then 
overrides the natural liberty of self-help, but only by replacing it with the 
state’s obligation to protect. 
Frank I. Michelman, in LEONARD W. LEVY AND KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, Vol. 4, 2029 (2nd ed. 2000). 
 28 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
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him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the 
land.”29 
In 1354, under Edward III, Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta was 
revised and the new provision for the first time contained the phrase “due 
process.”30  At that time, the phrase was associated with a series of 
protections inherent in the trial process, like trial by jury,31 and as the Court 
later explained, at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the 
words “due process of law” were understood “to convey the same 
meaning as the words ’by the law of the land’” in Magna Carta.32  Of 
course, since the founding, “the amount and quality of process that our 
precedents have recognized as ‘due’ under the Clause has changed 
considerably.”33 
At the beginning, the Magna Carta “law of the land” meant, at the 
very least, that a person could not be deprived of liberty or property except 
pursuant to established law.  In other words, the “law of the land” imposed 
a rule of law principle. 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. at 2132 (quoting Magna Carta, ch. 29, in 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the 
Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (1797) (emphasis added)). 
 30 LEONARD W. LEVY & KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION, Vol. II, at 828 (2002) (“A 1354 act of Parliament reconfirming MAGNA 
CARTA paraphrased its chapter 29 as follows: ‘That no man  . . . shall be put out of Land 
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being 
brought in Answer by due Process of Law.’ This was the first reference to due process in 
English legal history. Chapter 29 of the 1225 issue of Magna Carta originally concluded 
with the phrase ‘by the LAW OF THE LAND.’”) (emphasis in original). 
 31 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 
1048 (1984) (“Well before our Constitution was drafted, British jurists had definitively 
associated this phrase with a variety of protections inherent in the trial process, most 
notably trial by jury. The framers of the fifth amendment could not have doubted that the 
due process concept included such protections, whatever they may have thought about its 
effect on substantive legislation. The framers of the fourteenth amendment were certainly 
of the same view. The extent to which the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause was 
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights may be disputed, but it was at least intended to 
incorporate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. And no subsequent 
interpretation of either provision has seriously called its applicability to judicial trials into 
question.”). 
 32 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 
(1856); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 663 (1833) (“Lord 
Coke says, that these latter words, per legem terrae (by the law of the land,) mean by due 
process of law, that is, without due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to 
answer thereto by due process of the common law.”) It is true that the phrase “due process 
of law” technically referred to writs and forms of the law (process), but writs and forms 
defined the content of the law of the land. Cf. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 87-
95 (1973) (emphasizing the “process” aspect of the phrase, but failing to see the 
relationship between process and substantive law). 
 33 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28–36 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring 
in judgment). 
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The phrase “due process of law” then translated the law-of-the-land 
standard into a practical formula requiring the use of the appropriate 
(“due”) writ or form (“process of law”) in any act of potential deprivation.  
The required “process of law” reflected both the substantive and 
procedural components of the established law, drawing no distinction 
between the two.  In short, all potential deprivations ought to proceed 
according to the process that encompassed the substantive standard.  The 
due process standard, therefore, prohibited the King from imposing 
arbitrary deprivations on his subjects.  Logically, it followed, a law that 
vested the King with arbitrary power would be invalid as inconsistent with 
the rule-of-law premise of due process.  In short, to comply with due 
process an action ought to accord with an established, non-arbitrary 
standard of law. 
A. Procedural Due Process: The Path Traced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Opinions 
After the Magna Carta, the scope of “due process” continued to 
evolve, and the phrase appears in literally thousands of Supreme Court 
opinions. 
In many of those opinions, the phrase operates as nothing more than 
a passing reference; in others, it plays a pivotal role in the resolution of the 
controversy before the Court.  A good many of the cases in that latter group 
address the scope of procedural due process.  No single opinion, though, 
offers a clear statement of the theory of procedural due process. 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. stands as the 
Court’s first foray into the law of procedural due process.34  At issue in 
that case was the constitutionality of a distress warrant issued by the 
Department of Treasury to secure property purchased by a customs 
collector who had allegedly used funds embezzled from the Treasury to 
purchase the property.  The seizure was not preceded by notice or any form 
of hearing or judicial sanction, but was purely an exercise of executive 
authority undertaken pursuant to a federal statute that authorized the 
issuance of such warrants.  The Hoboken Court upheld the executive 
action as consistent with due process. 
The Court opened its due process analysis by observing that “[t]he 
words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the 
same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta.  
                                                                                                             
 34 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
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Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they mean 
due process of law.”35 
The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of those phrases, and 
endorsed a mechanical method of analysis, which was one large step 
removed from the principle: 
The constitution contains no description of those processes which 
it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what 
principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due 
process . . . . To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain 
whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process? To this 
the answer must be twofold. We must examine the constitution 
itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its 
provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled 
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and 
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and 
which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and 
political condition by having been acted on by them after the 
settlement of this country.36 
The Hoboken Court’s method of judicial inquiry—relying 
exclusively on constitutional text and tradition—suggested that due 
process required nothing more than a pedigree of past practices.  Indeed, 
the Court upheld the non-judicial issuance of the distress warrant based 
solely on its view that the Treasury had acted in conformity with a statute 
(law of the land) and that the statute found its roots in XVIII century 
practices by the Crown (due process).37 
Even less enlightening was the Court’s circular approach in Walker 
v. Sauvinet,38 where the Court rejected defendant’s argument that due 
process entitled him to a jury trial in a civil proceeding by observing that 
[d]ue process of law is process due according to the law of the 
land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the State. 
Our power over that law is only to determine whether it is in 
conflict with the supreme law of the land . . . . Art. 6 Const. Here 
the State court has decided that the proceeding below was in 
accordance with the law of the State; and we do not find that to be 
contrary to the Constitution, or any law or treaty of the United 
States.39 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. at 276. This was also the view endorsed by Justice Joseph Story in his influential 
treatise on the Constitution. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 32, at 663. 
 36 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276–77. 
 37 Id. at 276–79. 
 38 92 U.S. 90 (1876). 
 39 Id. at 93. 
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In Hurtado v. California, 40 a case involving procedure in a criminal 
case, the Court seemed to endorse a slightly more expansive (and perhaps 
more theoretical) approach to due process.  There it quoted, with approval, 
Justice William Johnson’s views: 
As to the words from Magna Charta . . . after volumes spoken and 
written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind 
has at last settled down to this: that they were intended to secure 
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private 
right and distributive justice.41 
And those of Thomas Cooley: 
The principles, then, upon which the process is based, are to 
determine whether it is ‘due process’ or not, and not any 
considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial process 
may be changed from time to time, but only with due regard to the 
landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. 42 
Arguably, the statements of Johnson and Cooley locate the principle 
of due process in a non-formalistic prescription against arbitrary laws and 
abjure considerations of mere form.  But what the Hurtado Court may have 
given with one hand, it withdrew with another: 
The real syllabus of the passage quoted is that a process of law, 
which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process 
of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England 
and in this country; but it by no means follows, that nothing else 
can be due process of law . . . . But to hold that such a 
characteristic is essential to due process of law, would be to deny 
every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of 
progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our 
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the 
Medes and Persians.43 
Thus, the Court recognized that novel procedures could be deemed 
due process, but adhered to the view that established practices remained 
sufficient.  In short, the right to due process remained grounded in past 
practices, though the Court was willing to recognize deviations from those 
past practices as constituting due process under appropriate circumstances. 
The Court’s methodological and non-theoretical approach to 
procedural due process continued into the early twentieth century, and is 
                                                                                                             
 40 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 41 Id. at 527 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 234, 244 (1819)). 
 42 Id. at 527–29. 
 43 Id. 
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aptly exemplified by its decision in Twining v. New Jersey.44 There the 
Court described a triumvirate of standards that controlled its due process 
jurisprudence: 
First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an 
examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings 
existing in the common and statute law of England before the 
emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited 
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by 
them after the settlement of this country . . . . 
Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in 
English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this 
country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essential element of 
due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half 
of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American 
jurisprudence like a straight jacket, only to be unloosed by 
constitutional amendment . . . . 
Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no 
change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those 
fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by 
judicial action, which have relation to process of law, and protect 
the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary 
action of government.45 
In short, “settled usages” were sufficient but not necessary to due 
process. Applying this method, the Court concluded that the principle of 
self-incrimination was not a necessary settled usage within the meaning of 
the due process clause.  The “plus” of both Hurtado and Twining was the 
Court’s recognition that due process was meant to prevent arbitrary 
government action. 
It is perhaps ironic that three years prior to the Court’s decision in 
Twining, the Court had enforced an expansive version of substantive due 
process in Lochner v. New York.46  There the Court found that New York’s 
maximum work week hour requirement was “an unreasonable, 
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to 
his personal liberty.”47  The Court’s opinion, however, was less about a 
theory of due process than it was about a theory of economics.48 
The two most important procedural due process cases of the first half 
of the XX century were undoubtedly International Shoe Co. v. 
                                                                                                             
 44 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 45 Id. at 100–01. 
 46 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 47 Id. at 56, 62. 
 48 Id. at 74–75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Washington49 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.50  Both 
cases followed the established due process model of validating novel 
practices that did not have the pedigree of settled usage, but they also 
offered more of a window into the meaning of due process.  International 
Shoe’s reference to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 
gave prime importance to fairness and reasonableness,51 while Mullane 
cast the due process inquiry as a balance between the interests of the state 
and the interests of the individual: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections The notice must be of such 
nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it 
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their 
appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and 
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the 
constitutional requirements are satisfied. “The criterion is not the 
possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable 
character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with 
which the statute deals.” 
. . . . 
But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture 
is not due process. The means employed must be such as one 
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the 
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on 
the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those 
affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such 
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring 
home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.52 
Thus, Mullane and International Shoe gave us a sense that the core of 
procedural due process is some combination of fairness and 
reasonableness that requires a balancing between the interests of the state 
and the individual.53 
                                                                                                             
 49 326 U.S. 310 (1950). 
 50 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 51 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 52 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted). 
 53 See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) 
(due process requires balancing of liberty interests against relevant state interests). 
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Shortly after the decision in Mullane, the Court added some 
independent weight to the idea of fairness when, in Bolling v. Sharpe,54 a 
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,55 the Court observed that 
[w]e have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining 
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the 
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth 
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does 
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of 
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal 
protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited 
unfairness than due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not 
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this 
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to 
be violative of due process.56 
This broader sense of fairness is also reflected in Justice Harlan’s 
dissent from Poe v. Ullman, and in the modern Court’s overall 
jurisprudence of substantive due process, where fairness becomes a 
product of the liberty interest at stake and arbitrariness is measured in light 
of the weight to be given that liberty interest.57 
These essential components of due process analysis—fairness, 
reasonableness, and balancing—remain the core features of procedural 
due process.  The balancing aspect of due process methodology is also 
well established and reflected in Mathews v. Eldridge:58 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific 
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.59 
                                                                                                             
 54 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 55 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 56 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–99. 
 57 ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 78-131 (7th ed 2016). 
 58 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 59 Id. at 334–45. 
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A wide range of decisions incorporates these features through a case-
by-case, context-specific assessment of due process. What emerges is a 
collection of platitudes, rules with exceptions, and a somewhat ad hoc and 
inconsistent applications of the variable standards of fairness and 
reasonableness.  Here is a broad sampling of recent decisions. 
Ingraham v. Wright:60 
“[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due process is not 
infinite.”  We have repeatedly rejected “the notion that any grievous loss 
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural 
protections of the Due Process Clause.”  Due process is required only 
when a decision of the State implicates an interest within the protection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. And “to determine whether due process 
requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but 
to the nature of the interest at stake.”61 
O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center:62 
Procedural due process seeks to ensure the accurate determination of 
decisional facts, and informed unbiased exercises of official discretion.63 
Davis v. Scherer:64 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental 
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ 
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
or Fourteenth Amendment . . . . This Court consistently has held 
that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally 
deprived of a property interest.  The ‘right to be heard before being 
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may 
not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a 
principle basic to our society.’ The fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’65 
Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors:66 
[T]he very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the 
fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the 
result obtained in any individual case; rather, 
“procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error 
                                                                                                             
 60 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 61 Id. at 672. 
 62 447 U.S. 773 (1980). 
 63 Id. at 797. 
 64 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 
 65 Id. at 202 (quoting Justice Powell in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332–33). 
 66 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
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inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of 
cases, not the rare exceptions.”67 
Dowling v. U.S.:68 
Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the 
Due Process Clause has limited operation.  We, therefore, have defined 
the category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” very 
narrowly. As we observed in Lovasco  . . . 
”Judges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law 
enforcement officials [their] ‘personal and private notions’ of 
fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their 
judicial function.’ . . . . [They] are to determine only whether the 
action complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions 
of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political 
institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play 
and decency’.”69 
Zinermon v. Burch:70 
First, the [Due Process] Clause incorporates many of the specific 
protections defined in the Bill of Rights . . . . Second, the Due 
Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain 
arbitrary, wrongful government actions “regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them.” . . . 
The Due Process Clause also encompasses a third type of 
protection, a guarantee of fair procedure . . . . In procedural due 
process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally 
protected interest in “life, liberty, or property” is not in itself 
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of 
such an interest without due process of law. (“Procedural due 
process rules are meant to protect persons not from the 
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property”) . . . . Therefore, to determine whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what 
process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally 
adequate. This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards 
built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the 
deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided 
by statute or tort law. 
. . . . 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. at 321 (internal citations omitted). 
 68 493 U.S. 342 (1990). 
 69 Id. at 352–53 (internal citations omitted). 
 70 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
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Due process, as this Court often has said, is a flexible concept that 
varies with the particular situation. To determine what procedural 
protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh 
several factors: 
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.” 
Applying this test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution 
requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person 
of liberty or property [and] “some kind of notice . . . . In some 
circumstances, however, the Court has held that a statutory 
provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common-law tort 
remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.71 
Justice Scalia concurring in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip:72 
[O]ur due process opinions in recent decades have 
indiscriminately applied balancing analysis to determine 
“fundamental fairness,” without regard to whether the procedure 
under challenge was (1) a traditional one and, if so, (2) prohibited 
by the Bill of Rights. Even so, however, very few cases have used 
the Due Process Clause, without the benefit of an accompanying 
bill of Rights guarantee, to strike down a procedure concededly 
approved by traditional and continuing American practice. Most 
notably, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 
U.S. 337, 340 (1969), over the strenuous dissent of Justice Black, 
the Court declared unconstitutional the garnishment of wages, 
saying that “the fact that a procedure would pass muster under a 
feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all 
property in its modern forms.” And in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186 (1977), the Court invalidated general quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
saying that “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ 
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms 
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures 
that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional 
heritage,” id. at 212. Such cases, at least in their broad 
                                                                                                             
 71 Id. at 125–28. 
 72 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
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pronouncements if not with respect to the particular provisions at 
issue, were in my view wrongly decided.73 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg:74 
Because the basic procedural protections of the common law have 
been regarded as so fundamental, very few cases have arisen in 
which a party has complained of their denial. In fact, most of our 
due process decisions involve arguments that traditional 
procedures provide too little protection and that additional 
safeguards are necessary to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Burnham v. 
Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party has been 
deprived of liberty or property without the safeguards of common-
law procedure. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) . . . . When the absent 
procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and 
inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the 
proceedings violative of due process. Of course, not all deviations 
from established procedures result in constitutional infirmity. As 
the Court noted in Hurtado, to hold all procedural change 
unconstitutional “would be to deny every quality of the law but its 
age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.”75 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis:76 
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid 
and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of 
rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality 
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute 
a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. at 36. Although Justice Scalia would not go as far as to say “that every practice 
sanctioned by history is constitutional,” id. at 38, he would certainly give dispositive 
weight to widespread adherence to a historical practice (“I reject the principle . . . that a 
traditional procedure of our society becomes unconstitutional whenever the Members of 
this Court ‘lose . . .  confidence’ in it.” Scalia, J., concurring in judgment, id. (internal 
citations omitted)), emphasizing that the Due Process’s “‘function is negative, not 
affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform.’” Id. at 39 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 74 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
 75 Id. at 430–31 (internal citations omitted). 
 76 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 
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of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other 
considerations, fall short of such denial.77 
 . . . . 
We have emphasized time and again that “[t]he touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), whether 
the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, 
see, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972), 
(the procedural due process guarantee protects against “arbitrary 
takings”), or in the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective, 
see, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S., at 331 (the substantive due 
process guarantee protects against government power arbitrarily 
and oppressively exercised). While due process protection in the 
substantive sense limits what the government may do in both its 
legislative, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), and its executive capacities, see, e.g., Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952), criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary 
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a 
governmental officer that is at issue.78 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.:79 
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate 
the due process “principle of general application in Anglo–
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in 
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or 
to which he has not been made a party by service of process,” it 
being “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should 
have his own day in court[.]’”  Although “we have recognized an 
exception to the general rule when, in certain limited 
circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests 
adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is 
a party,” or “where a special remedial scheme exists expressly 
foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in 
bankruptcy or probate,”  the burden of justification rests on the 
exception . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . We raised the flag on this issue of due process more than a 
decade ago in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 
(1985) [and] held that out-of-state plaintiffs could not invoke the 
                                                                                                             
 77 Id. at 850 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)). 
 78 Id. at 845–46. 
 79 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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same due process limits on personal jurisdiction that out-of-state 
defendants had under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny.  But we also saw that before an 
absent class member’s right of action was 
extinguishable due process required that the member “receive 
notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the 
litigation,” and we said that “at a minimum . . . an absent plaintiff 
[must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from 
the class.”80 
Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.:81 
In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961), we said: “The very nature of due process negates any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 
imaginable situation.  ‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances. It is compounded of history, reason, the 
past course of decisions . . . .”82 
Justice Ginsburg dissenting in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White:83 
This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the 
litigant’s right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to “an impartial and disinterested tribunal 
in both civil and criminal cases[.] The proscription against pledges 
or promises thus represents an accommodation of “constitutionally 
protected interests [that] lie on both sides of the legal equation.” 
Balanced against the candidate’s interest in free expression is the 
litigant’s “powerful and independent constitutional interest in fair 
adjudicative procedure.” (“Two principles are in conflict and 
must, to the extent possible, be reconciled . . . . The roots of both 
principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage.”). 
The impartiality guaranteed to litigants through 
the Due Process Clause adheres to a core principle: “[N]o man is 
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” 
Our cases have “jealously guarded” that basic concept, for it 
“ensur[es] that no person will be deprived of his interests in the 
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with 
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”84 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. at 846–48. 
 81 532 U.S. 189 (2001). 
 82 Id. at 196–97. 
 83 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 84 Id. at 813–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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Wilkinson v. Austin:85 
Our procedural due process cases have consistently observed that 
these are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes 
of avoiding erroneous deprivations.86 
Turner v. Rogers:87 
“[W]e consequently determine the ‘specific dictates of due process’ 
by examining the ‘distinct factors’ that this Court has previously found 
useful in deciding what specific safeguards the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil 
proceeding fundamentally fair.”88 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro:89 
“Due process protects the defendant’s right not to be coerced except 
by lawful judicial power.”90 
Bank Markazi v. Peterson:91 
“The Due Process Clause also protects the interest in fair notice and 
repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.”92 
Although a general pattern of due process analysis has emerged and 
is reflected in many of the above quotations, the absence of a unifying 
theory is evident and there remains some areas of critical disagreement 
pertaining to application. 
The Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior Court93 reflects some 
of that tension. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, tightly linked due 
                                                                                                             
 85 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 86 Id. at 226 (citing see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. V. Loundermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 
(1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central 
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected 
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be 
notified’” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864))). 
 87 564 U.S. 431 (2011). 
 88 Id. at 444–45. It is interesting to note how the Court, in determining whether the case 
presents a violation of procedural due process rights, refer to “factors” of a test, rather than 
to the overarching principle. Will those “factors” always provide the right guidance? Are 
those factors exhaustive, comprehensive? Do they properly capture the wide range of 
interests that any given situation might present? Do they thoroughly address the risk of 
error? In the absence of an underlying, comprehensive, overarching due process 
theory/principle capable of application to a wide range of cases, it is hard to answer. Also, 
the absence of any such theory will require the formulation of further tests as we are 
presented with new situations that do not perfectly fit the Mathews test. 
 89 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 90 Id. at 877. 
 91 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 92 Id. at 1325. 
 93 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
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process to tradition and settled usage.94  Justice White, concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment, admitted the possibility that a widespread 
practice validated by tradition could still violate due process if it were “so 
arbitrary and lacking in common sense.”95  And Justice Brennan, 
concurring in the judgment, took an even less charitable view of historical 
practices, stating, “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice’ can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms 
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are 
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.”96 
While the distinctions among the Burnham Justices may turn less on 
the meaning of due process than on each Justice’s views of the Court’s 
interpretive function, it remains possible, and perhaps likely, that this 
divergence of views is also a product of the lack of a theoretical foundation 
for the Court’s jurisprudence of due process.97 
B. What’s missing? 
What’s missing in the above opinions is the overarching due process 
principle, the foundational due process theory from which new rules and 
doctrines might be derived by way of interpretation.  This deficiency is 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 622 (characterizing due process as “a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that 
dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed 
unquestionably meets that standard.”). 
 95 Id. at 628. 
 96 Id. at 630 (internal citations omitted). 
 97 Id. at 101–02; see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936) 
(“A determination of the question whether the tax is valid in respect of the point now under 
review requires an examination of the history and circumstances which antedated and 
attended the adoption of the abridgement clause of the First Amendment, since that clause 
expresses one of those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base 
of all our civil and political institutions’ and, as such, is embodied in the concept ‘due 
process of law’ and, therefore, protected against hostile state invasion by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted); De Jonge v. State of 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion 
elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating 
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and 
political institutions—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the 
general terms of its due process clause.”); Buchalter v. People of State of New York, 319 
U.S. 427, 429–30 (1943) (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that action by a state through any of its agencies must be consistent with 
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and 
political institutions, which not infrequently are designated as the ‘law of the land.’”); 
Lyons v. State of Okl., 322 U.S. 596, 601–02 (1944) (“The federal question presented is 
whether the second confession was given under such circumstances that its use as evidence 
at the trial constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which requires that state criminal proceedings ‘shall be consistent with 
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice.”). 
2017] Procedural Due Process 177 
puzzling given that every procedural category used or discussed by the 
Court is premised on that very theory. 
So what could be the reason behind this deficiency?  Could it be, as 
the Court observed, that “[t]he basic procedural protections of the common 
law have been regarded as so fundamental, [that] very few cases have 
arisen in which a party has complained of their denial?”98  Or is it perhaps 
that procedural due process is one of those very concepts whose meaning 
and scope are so pervasive and so intuitive that they don’t require full 
articulation?  But is either really so?  What if the lack of true understanding 
of the theory of procedural due process were responsible for the scarce 
number of procedural due process complaints? And what if the lack of true 
understanding of the theory of procedural due process were responsible of 
some of the Court’s opinions that are hardly conducive of democracy?99  
Although the scope of procedural due process is so pervasive, it is not 
necessarily equally intuitive. 
The theory of procedural due process that one derives from the 
Court’s passages above is one requiring “minimum procedural 
safeguards,”100 “rules . . . shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process,”101 and by “those fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,”102 rules 
intended to promote an “accurate determination of decisional facts, and 
informed by unbiased exercises of official discretion.”103  The principle, 
so described, remains general, and necessarily so given that, as the Court 
explained, the concept is “flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”104  Procedural due process 
doesn’t demand exactness.105 Instead, it only demands that the procedure 
in place, balancing fairness and efficiency concerns, and the opposing 
interests of the parties and the judicial system as a whole, reaches the 
optimal result. 
                                                                                                             
 98 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1994). 
 99 See infra Part III. 
 100 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 624 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring). 
 101 Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985). 
 102 De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364. 
 103 O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 797 (1980). 
 104 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip., 499 U.S. 1, 53 (1991). 
 105 See, for example, the standards of “more likely than not”, “clear and convincing 
evidence,”—applicable in civil cases—and “beyond reasonable doubt”—applicable in 
criminal cases. None of these standards requires exactness, certainty. But they are all 
intended to achieve the optimal balance between the various conflicting interests and needs 
of the parties involved, of the judicial system, and society, as well as the needs of logic, 
efficiency, fairness, and democracy. 
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Justice Scalia would likely disagree with the above description.106  
He would argue that the text of the Constitution or, in its absence, the 
common law practices and procedure should control.  Stare decisis, 
though, and adherence to the established rules and practices should be just 
part of the analysis if we are to adhere to due process.  A due process 
analysis would factor in the past, but would not lead the past control the 
present, a result that would clearly be inconsistent not only with due 
process, but with the very essence of the common law system,107 a system 
designed to be flexible, in service of the people, evolving with the people.  
Justice Scalia, though, viewed stare decisis as indispensable to achieve the 
equal protection of the laws,108 and that approach, sometimes followed by 
                                                                                                             
 106 See supra notes 72 and 93–94 and accompanying text.  See also Justice Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989): 
I had always thought that the common-law approach had at least one thing to 
be said for it: it was the course of judicial restraint, “making” as little law as 
possible in order to decide the case at hand. I have come to doubt whether that 
is true. For when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general 
rule, and say, “This is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower 
courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such different 
facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite 
the opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed 
myself to the governing principle. In the real world of appellate judging, it 
displays more judicial restraint to adopt such a course than to announce that, 
“on balance,” we think the law was violated here— leaving ourselves free to 
say in the next case that, “on balance,” it was not. It is a commonplace that 
the one effective check upon arbitrary judges is criticism by the bar and the 
academy. But it is no more possible to demonstrate the inconsistency of two 
opinions based upon a “totality of the circumstances” test than it is to 
demonstrate the inconsistency of two jury verdicts. Only by announcing rules 
do we hedge ourselves in. 
 107 When commenting on the common law system, Justice Scalia noted that 
sticking close to those facts, not relying upon overarching generalizations, 
and thereby leaving considerable room for future judges is thought to be the 
genius of the common law system. The law grows and develops, the theory 
goes, not through the pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, 
deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time. Today we decide that these 
nine facts sustain recovery. Whether only eight of them will do so—or 
whether the addition of a tenth will change the outcome—are questions for 
another day. 
Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1177. 
 108 Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1178 (“To begin with, 
the value of perfection in judicial decisions should not be overrated. To achieve what is, 
from the standpoint of the substantive policies involved, the ‘perfect’ answer is nice—but 
it is just one of a number of competing values. And one of the most substantial of those 
competing values, which often contradicts the search for perfection, is the appearance of 
equal treatment . . . . The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any other 
provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to 
judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well. When a case 
is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of 
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the Court, has led to results that are hardly conducive of due process and 
democratic values. 
Roscoe Pound described the jurisprudential thinking over time in 
terms of jurisprudence of conceptions, a jurisprudence of premises, and an 
empirical jurisprudence.109  Under the jurisprudence of conceptions 
“[c]ertain fundamental conceptions are worked out from traditional legal 
principles, and the rules for the cause in hand are deduced from these 
conceptions by a purely logical process.”110  The jurisprudence of premises 
takes “the rules of a traditional system . . . as premises and . . . develop[s] 
these premises in accordance with some theory of the ends to be met or of 
the relation which they should bear, when applied, to the social condition 
of the time being.”111  Here, pure logic is tempered by consideration of the 
consequences, but still the analysis is cabined within the abstract legal 
standards and categories.  Finally, an empirical jurisprudence begins with 
the facts and operates through a “process of inclusion and exclusion” and 
a method of “trial-hypothesis and confirmation” to discover the law.112 
Pound thought that the first two categories of jurisprudence—
conceptions and premises—were inadequate, as both were premised to 
some extent on the perceived immutability of established legal standards.  
If not based on natural law itself, they operated on the natural-law 
understanding that law can be perfectly established and, once so 
established, can serve as a sufficient tool for solving present claims and 
controversies, even those that were unanticipated by the law maker.  Pound 
thought that the empirical jurisprudence was problematic too: the law 
would develop too slowly through the case-by-case approach, and courts 
were “over-ambitio[us]” when “lay[ing] down universal rules,” turning 
the empirical jurisprudence into a jurisprudence of conceptions.113  Pound 
still considered the empirical jurisprudence to be the best of the 
alternatives, despite its flaws. 
As I have elsewhere argued,114 the current U.S. Supreme Court’s 
modern jurisprudence doesn’t fit any of the above categories.  The Court’s 
jurisprudence can’t be described as a jurisprudence of conceptions or 
premises as, even if the Court often invokes established principles, it just 
as often ignores those principles or distorts them in service of unstated 
                                                                                                             
justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be 
so.”). 
 109 Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361 (1913). 
 110 Id. at 371. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 372. 
 114 See SIMONA GROSSI, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MODERN COMMON LAW 
APPROACH, 6–7 (2015). 
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goals. Often the Court sees cases and opinions as opportunities to legislate, 
and when it legislates, it does so through narrow rules and rigid multipart 
formulas that are not conducive to due process analysis.115  And the 
Court’s jurisprudence cannot be described as empirical either when its 
purported goal is to discover the true meaning of the law in original 
understandings and fundamental texts, beyond the very facts before the 
Court. 
The Court’s modern jurisprudence and, in particular Justice Scalia’s 
interpretive approach, is not conducive to due process. As the Court noted 
in the late XIX century, to make stare decisis controlling “would be to 
deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of 
progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the 
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”116 
A textual approach to due process that views the due process function 
as a “negative, not affirmative, [one carrying] no mandate for particular 
measures of reform”117 negates the very essence of due process and 
deprives due process of the potential of inspiring and ultimately shaping 
rules and doctrines in service of our democratic system.  And, in any event, 
even if the Court has sometimes described the due process function as a 
“negative” one, that is, one intended to protect the individual against 
arbitrary state action,118 due process has a positive function too as it 
imposes an obligation on the states to provide a judicial system that is fair, 
efficient, and just. 
The core of due process is balance.  It is the balance between the 
interests of the individuals—the parties directly and indirectly affected by 
the rule, doctrine, or the outcome of the litigation—and the society those 
individuals belong to.  It is the balance between formalism—intended as 
adherence to the rule of law, transparency, and predictability—and 
pragmatism—intended as a case-by-case approach to the facts and 
innovation, adaptation of the given categories to the specific needs of the 
cases, and consideration of the totality of the circumstances presented.119  
                                                                                                             
 115 Id. See, e.g., Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1177 (“[P]erfect 
justice can only be achieved if courts are unconstrained by such imperfect 
generalizations.”). Justice Scalia also thought narrow rules were indispensable in a 
common law system where the Supreme Court only reviews “an insignificant proportion 
of the decided cases” and “will revisit the area in question with great infrequency.” Id. at 
1178. 
 116 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528–29 (1884). 
 117 Owney v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). 
 118 See, e.g., id.; see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 
97–98 (4th ed. 2002). 
 119 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998). Rejecting the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, Justice Scalia noted: 
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The demand of justice that each case presents comes from the very facts 
of that case, to which a judge must attend, balancing the conflicting 
interests and needs. And it is the balance between pre-existing ideas and 
conceptions and the needs for reform. 
That balance is the core of due process should not surprise, as due 
process is intended to achieve peace, and peace is balance.  The more 
factors, that is, the more variables meaningfully affecting any given 
situation that balance will ponder, the more that balance will minimize the 
risk of error and approximate peace.120  The fact-finding role of the judge 
                                                                                                             
The fact is that when we decide a case on the basis of what we have come to 
call the “totality of the circumstances” test, it is not we who will be “closing 
in on the law” in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different courts of 
appeals—or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state court litigation as 
well, thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state supreme courts. To 
adopt such an approach, in other words, is effectively to conclude that 
uniformity is not a particularly important objective with respect to the legal 
question at issue. 
Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 107, at 1179. Scalia also noted that: 
when an appellate judge comes up with nothing better than a totality of the 
circumstances test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the 
law in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact 
finding. That is certainly how we describe the function of applying the most 
venerable totality of the circumstances test of them all—the “reasonable man” 
standard for determining negligence in the law of torts. At the margins, of 
course, that determination, like every determination of pure fact or mixed fact 
and law, can become an issue of law—if, for example, there is no evidence 
on which any jury can reasonably find negligence. And even short of that 
extreme, the courts have introduced some elements of law into the 
determination—the rule, for example, that disregard of some statutorily 
prescribed safeguards is negligence per se,
 
or the opposite rule that 
compliance with all the requirements of certain statutes precludes a finding 
of negligence.
 
But when all those legal rules have been exhausted and have 
yielded no answer, we call what remains to be decided a question of fact— 
which means not only that it is meant for the jury rather than the judge, but 
also that there is no single “right” answer. It could go either way. Only, as I 
say, at the margins can an appellate judge say that this determination must 
come out the other way as a matter of law. 
Id. at 1180–81. 
 120 Justice Scalia, though, would reduce the variables at stake in due process analysis to 
one: predictability. 
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as 
possible a clear, general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler 
times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law. 
Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the 
means of knowing what it prescribes . . . . As laws have become more 
numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their 
adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty 
regarding what the law may mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, 
“reckonability,”
 
is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. 
There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all. 
182 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:155 
is essential to the judge’s justice mission.  So, the factual component is 
essential to legal analysis, and in fact, it is essential to any legal analysis 
that is consistent with due process, as the law doesn’t exist in abstract, it 
exists and is created through the facts, with the facts. 
A judicial opinion that gave primacy to the law over the facts of the 
case would fail to accomplish its justice mission.  Hence, the Court’s 
approach and Justice Scalia’s position to the contrary121 are troublesome.  
And it is troublesome that Justice Scalia viewed balance in legal analysis 
as the very last resort.122 
The legislature operates in a place far remote from cases.  And in 
making the best synthesis, the best balance of the variables most recurring 
in the type of cases under exam that it can, the legislature produces rules 
that are capable of application to a wide range of cases.  To be optimal and 
consistent with due process those rules should factor in the various 
conflicting interests at stake, the needs of fairness, efficiency, logic, 
democracy, and they should be drafted in a way that provides guidance to 
judges and lawyers without unnecessarily constraining these actors’ 
discretion.  The legislature’s rules should allow judges and lawyers to 
draw balances of the conflicting interests that would be optimal in any 
given situation. 
This is because judges and lawyers, unlike the legislature, will in fact 
be exposed to real cases, each presenting variables that might not 
necessarily be those originally considered by the legislature.  To be 
consistent with the balance of due process, the legislative rules should 
allow lawyers and judges to catch and ponder the new variables that each 
case presents.  And in deciding the very cases presented and formulating 
doctrines that interpret the existing rules and principles, judges should 
disclose the analytic path followed, the various conflicting interests at 
stake, the needs of efficiency, fairness, logic, and the way in which those 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 1799. And, yes, predictability ensures that procedure be fair and just and efficient, 
but predictability is just one factor. An opinion that is predictable but that does not make 
justice in the particular case presented, one that doesn’t optimally balance the conflicting 
interests at stake, is not necessarily a just opinion. 
 121 See infra Part III. 
 122 Justice Scalia observed: 
We will have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of 
analysis with us forever—and for my sins, I will probably write some of the 
opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of analysis be avoided 
where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as 
the nature of the question allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward 
the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally 
reached the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of the 
circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the 
law. 
Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 107, at 1187 (emphasis added). 
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interests and needs have been balanced.  The judicial doctrine or formula 
finally endorsed should be flexible enough to allow other judges and 
lawyers to use it prospectively and adapt it to still other different situations 
presented. 
Due process fits well into a representative democracy, and easily 
aligns with the inherently democratic principles of liberty and equality.  
Thus, the requirement that the law be established honors the democratic 
voice in the lawmaking function as well as the principle of fair notice, 
while the proscription against arbitrary laws honors the democratic 
commitment to equality. 
Whether a law is deemed arbitrary depends on whether it contains 
discernable standards and whether those standards are reasonable.  The 
absence of discernable standards runs the risk of violating the principle of 
equality.  But the absence of reasonableness would invite unjustified 
intrusions on liberty.  As to the latter, the due process measure of 
reasonableness requires a balancing of the private and public interests at 
stake.  This balancing must take into account fairness, efficiency, 
institutional competence, and the ultimate rationality of the standard at 
issue. As Justice Harlan recognized in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, the 
demands of that rationality will vary with the nature of the right and the 
scope of the intrusion.123 
Given the inherent democratic commitment to liberty and equality, 
due process rationality must require something more than just a deeply 
held belief in the righteousness of the law.124  Rather, rationality must be 
built on facts.  In other words, democratic rationality requires a faith-
neutral examination of the facts.  That does not mean that faith plays no 
part in a democracy; faith may be the driving force that leads to the 
enactment of a rational statute such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  But 
faith alone cannot justify the democratic rationality of the enactment.  
Hence, democratic rationality is a rationality premised on facts and reason.  
In the context of substantive due process, that means that a law’s 
legitimacy cannot rest on faith alone; and in the context of procedure, “this 
is how we’ve always done it,” cannot itself establish the modern rationality 
of the procedure at issue. 
                                                                                                             
 123 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522–55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 124 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“Judges are not free, in 
defining “due process,” to impose on law enforcement officials our “personal and private 
notions” of fairness and to “disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE 
Testing some procedural rules and doctrines against the due process 
platform provided in Part II will help identify inconsistencies with the due 
process theory so far articulated, and further refine the theory itself. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In Gully v. First Nat. Bank,125 the Court articulated the subject matter, 
federal-question, arising-under formula as follows: 
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, 
and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The right or 
immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution 
or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, 
and defeated if they receive another. A genuine and present 
controversy, not merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist 
with reference thereto, and the controversy must be disclosed upon 
the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition 
for removal. Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as a basis 
of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable 
defense.126 
The Gully Court also added: 
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the attempt 
to define a ‘cause of action’ without reference to the context. To 
define broadly and in the abstract ‘a case arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States’ has hazards of a kindred 
order. What is needed is something of that common-sense 
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which 
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation. 
One could carry the search for causes backward, almost without 
end. Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the 
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside. As 
in problems of causation, so here in the search for the underlying 
law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right 
can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in 
the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with 
its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set 
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction 
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, 
                                                                                                             
 125 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
 126 Id. at 112–13 (internal citations omitted). 
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between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely 
possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.127 
The formula, flexible and principled, perfectly captured the law of 
subject matter jurisdiction as it then stood: federal law had to be an 
essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for a federal court to have federal 
question jurisdiction over that claim.  And it made sense.  If the 
controversy on federal law is “merely possible or conjectural,”128 a federal 
court’s involvement in the dispute won’t be supported by § 1331.  And, of 
course, the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry must be a context-specific 
inquiry, one that requires a “common-sense accommodation of judgment 
to kaleidoscopic situations.”129  By assessing the plaintiff’s claim in the 
case, one for breach of contract, one whose resolution did not depend on 
the interpretation, application, or effect of federal law, the Court concluded 
that the case was not one arising under federal law and, thus, federal courts 
would not have subject matter jurisdiction over it. 
As described, the Gully subject matter jurisdiction formula seems 
complete, adaptable to the many different variables that each case may 
present, and truthful to the idea of federal courts as courts for the 
vindication and enforcement of federal rights and the uniform 
interpretation and application of federal law.130  The opinion in Gunn v. 
Minton131 is hard to reconcile with this formula and, more generally, with 
due process. 
Endorsing the subject matter jurisdiction test articulated in Grable & 
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mgf.,132 the Gunn Court 
found that the plaintiff’s malpractice claim whose success depended on 
the interpretation and application of federal patent law did not arise under 
federal law, because it foundered on the third prong of the Grable test. 
Basically, although federal law was essential to the plaintiff’s claim,133 and 
“actually disputed,”134 it was not “substantial”—that is, not important 
enough for the federal system as a whole135—as the legal malpractice 
claim posed a federal question “in a merely hypothetical sense,”136 and 
                                                                                                             
 127 Id. at 118–19. 
 128 Id. at 113. 
 129 Id. 
 130 For further elaboration of this theme, see Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory, supra 
note 10, at 973–74. 
 131 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 132 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 133 Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 134 Id. at 1065–66. 
 135 Id. at 1066. 
 136 Id. at 1066–67 (Because of the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice 
claim, the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised 
a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the patent infringement proceeding 
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was “fact-bound and situation specific,”137 that is, not “controlling 
numerous other cases.”138  And because the claim foundered on the third 
prong of the Grable test, “[i]t follow[ed] that Grable’s fourth requirement 
[was] also not met.”139 
The opinion, entangled in the Grable test, failed to realistically 
appraise the plaintiff’s claim and gave primacy to the government’s 
interests, whatever they were in the case—hard to imagine that the federal 
government would not have a “strong interest” in providing a federal 
forum for the interpretation and application of patent law—over the 
interest of the plaintiff in having a federal forum for the vindication of his 
federal rights.  And, even more troubling, the Court indicated that claims 
that were “fact-bound and situation specific” would not meet the 
“substantial” prong of the Grable test.  What about the realistic appraisal 
demanded by due process?  What about the need to be attentive and 
responsive to the changing facts and circumstances?  And was Gunn 
respectful of Gully?  One could say that the modern approach to subject 
matter jurisdiction has to be traced to Grable, not to Gully.  But if one 
could defend the result in Grable under the “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice,” I’m not sure one could equally defend Gunn under 
similar bases. 
What about the plaintiff’s rights and expectations?  And was the 
interest of the judicial system as a whole in having federal courts available 
for the uniform interpretation and application of federal law and for the 
vindication of federal rights properly respected and considered?  In this 
respect, the Gunn Court noted that 
even assuming that a state court’s case-within-a-case adjudication 
may be preclusive under some circumstances, the result would be 
                                                                                                             
have been different? No matter how the state courts resolve that hypothetical “case within 
a case,” it will not change the real-world result of the prior federal patent 
litigation. Minton’s patent will remain invalid.). 
 137 Id. at 1068. 
 138 Id. at 1067. 
 139 Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.  The Court noted: 
That requirement is concerned with the appropriate “balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities.” We have already explained the absence of a 
substantial federal issue within the meaning of Grable.  The States, on the 
other hand, have ‘a special responsibility for maintaining standards among 
members of the licensed professions.’ Their ‘interest . . . in regulating 
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 
officers of the courts.’ We have no reason to suppose that Congress—in 
establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar 
from state courts state legal malpractice claims simply because they require 
resolution of a hypothetical patent issue. 
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limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state 
court. Such “fact-bound and situation-specific” effects are not 
sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction. 
Nor can we accept the suggestion that the federal courts’ greater 
familiarity with patent law means that legal malpractice cases like 
this one belong in federal court. It is true that a similar interest was 
among those we considered in Grable. But the possibility that a 
state court will incorrectly resolve a state claim is not, by itself, 
enough to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction, 
even if the potential error finds its root in a misunderstanding of 
patent law.140 
In other words, the possibility that the individual’s federal rights 
might not be properly honored should be given no weight in the analysis.  
The individual’s interests and rights were left out of the formula. 
The Court seemed to be concerned about the state system more than 
the individual.  After all, the Court noted, a state court’s decision on patent 
law would not affect the development of federal patent law.141  But 
wouldn’t it?  Shouldn’t we expect the patent lawyers to inform their 
methods and modes of litigating patent cases to the state courts’ approach 
to specific patent issues, as after Gunn, this is the exclusive place where 
they’ll be sued on legal malpractice claims arising from patent litigations? 
The individual’s interests are not considered, the system’s interests 
and the consequences on the system are not properly assessed, and the 
contextual, realistic appraisal of the facts is discarded.142  The opinion 
doesn’t seem informed by due process at all. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
In 1945, International Shoe Co. v. Washington143 extended the 
traditional territorial reach of personal jurisdiction to cases where, even if 
the defendant “be not present within the territory of the forum, he [has] 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”144  
When that happens, the exercise of personal jurisdiction will be consistent 
with due process,145 and it is so because the defendant’s “sufficient 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. at 1067–68 (internal citations omitted). 
 141 Id. at 1068. 
 142 In this respect, the Gunn Court also affirms that “for the reasons we discuss, we are 
comfortable concluding that state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent 
matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law for purposes of §1338(a).” Id. at 
1065. 
 143 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 144 Id. at 316. 
 145 Id. 
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contacts or ties with the state of the forum . . . make it reasonable and just 
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice 
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred 
there.”146 
The International Shoe formula was principled and flexible, it called 
for a realistic appraisal of the facts (the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum) while being respectful of the established tradition (“traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice”); it balanced the interests of 
the defendant (being sued in a forum where it could expect to be sued), the 
plaintiff (being able to sue in the forum where the claim arose and where 
the injury occurred), and the forum state and the judicial system as a whole 
(in having lawsuits tried in the forum where the center of gravity was); and 
it complied with logic, fairness and efficiency.  It made sense to try a case 
where the evidence would be, where the conduct complained of took place 
(center of gravity), and the injured party was.  The exercise of jurisdiction 
in the forum would be fair to the parties and their need to defend (the bulk 
of the evidence would be in the forum), and it would be efficient (there 
would be an optimal use of judicial and parties’ resources, as the evidence 
would be in the forum, and a judge of the forum would be called to 
interpret and apply a law of the forum state that was violated). 
That elegant, due process approach was not followed by the Court in 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,147 an opinion that is hard to 
reconcile with International Shoe.  In McIntyre, Nicastro, a resident of 
New Jersey, severely injured himself while using a three-ton metal 
shearing machine manufactured by the British manufacturer McIntyre 
UK.148  McIntyre UK had not directly shipped the machine to the forum, 
but instead its exclusive distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 
had.  But, despite the similar names, McIntyre UK and McIntyre America 
were separate and independent entities.149  And since McIntyre UK “had 
no office in New Jersey; it [did not pay] taxes nor owned property there; 
and it [did not] advertise[] in, nor sent any employees to, the State . . . [and 
did not] ‘have a single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in 
question ending up in this state[,]’ . . . [t]hese facts . . . do not show that 
J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”150  
Hence, the New Jersey court had no personal jurisdiction over McIntyre 
UK. 
                                                                                                             
 146 Id. at 320. 
 147 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 148 Id. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 896–97. 
 150 Id. at 886. 
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The realistic appraisal of the facts, that is, of the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum, is confined to the few paragraphs in Part I of the plurality 
opinion,151 authored by Justice Kennedy.  A more accurate and 
comprehensive assessment of those facts is offered by Justice Ginsburg, 
in her dissenting opinion.152  It is only there that we learn that Nicastro had 
severed four fingers of his right hand while using the machine;153 that the 
price of one machine was $ 24,900;154 that the machine ended up in New 
Jersey as a direct consequence of the successful marketing efforts of the 
defendant,155 and in the regular course of the defendant’s business;156 and 
that McIntyre UK had instructed its exclusive American distributor to sell 
the machines “anywhere in the U.S,”157 with no fear of successful litigation 
against McIntyre in the U.S. as “the product was built and designed by 
McIntyre Machinery in the UK and the buck stops here—if there’s 
something wrong with the machine,”158 and, in any event, “the 
manufacturer had products liability insurance coverage.”159  As Justice 
Ginsburg observed, the above realistic assessment of the facts coupled 
with a respect for the tradition, should have led to a finding of jurisdiction: 
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United 
States for machines it manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial 
revenue from sales it makes to United States purchasers. Where in 
the United States buyers reside does not matter to this 
manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever 
it can. It excludes no region or State from the market it wishes to 
reach. But, all things considered, it prefers to avoid products 
liability litigation in the United States. To that end, it engages a 
U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside. Has it succeeded in 
escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products 
is sold and causes injury or even death to a local user? 
Under this Court’s pathmarking precedent in International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, and subsequent decisions, one would expect 
the answer to be unequivocally, “No.” But instead, six Justices of 
this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has 
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 155 Id. at 895 (“CSM’s owner, Frank Curcio, ‘first heard of [McIntyre UK’s] machine 
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 156 Id. at 896 (“McIntyre UK representatives attended every ISRI convention from 1990 
through 2005.”). 
 157 Id. at 898. 
 158 Id. at 897. 
 159 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 897. 
190 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:155 
avoided the jurisdiction of our state courts, except perhaps in 
States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities. 
Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered 
majority today “turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern 
long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into 
court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands 
of a product by having independent distributors market it.”160 
And the opposite conclusion reached by the plurality and Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion161 took “a giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play 
and substantial justice’ underlying International Shoe.”162 
The opinion in McIntyre also failed to balance the interest of the 
defendant against the interest of the plaintiff and the judicial system as a 
whole.  Of course the defendant would be better off if sued in its own 
country, but what about the plaintiff, the individual who was injured in his 
forum while using the machine that the defendant has sold there making 
profit out of it?  And would the judicial system as a whole support such a 
finding of non-jurisdiction?  Essentially denying access to justice to a 
citizen of the forum, asking him to submit to a foreign jurisdiction and 
most likely foreign law to be compensated for the wrongful, and yet 
profitable, activity engaged in by the foreign corporation in the plaintiff’s 
own state?  Doesn’t this result defy logic, common sense, the fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice? 
If the answers to the above questions suggest that the opinion in 
McIntyre was not consistent with due process, then why did the Court 
reach that result? We may make hypotheses, build assumptions.  The Court 
was probably motivated by concerns for international relations.163  Or the 
Court just thought it was properly interpreting and applying the 
precedents—International Shoe, Hanson v. Denckla,164 World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,165 Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.,166 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 
County of Marin.167  And it was some of the precedents that might have 
                                                                                                             
 160 Id. at 893–94 (internal citations omitted). 
 161 Id. at 887–93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 162 Id. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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determined the outcome of the case, more specifically, Hanson and 
Burnham: 
The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the 
defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power 
of a sovereign. In other words, the defendant must “purposefully 
avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”168 
And: 
The conclusion that jurisdiction is in the first instance a question 
of authority rather than fairness explains, for example, why the 
principal opinion in Burnham “conducted no independent inquiry 
into the desirability or fairness” of the rule that service of process 
within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise 
foreign defendant.169 
But the realistic appraisal demanded by International Shoe did not 
make purposeful availment a determinative factor of the jurisdictional 
inquiry.  If you think about it, purposeful availment—or the defendant’s 
intent to enjoy, avail itself of “the benefits and protection of the laws of 
the state,”170 or “target,”171 using Justice Kennedy’s word—might be hard, 
and at times very hard, to determine.  And the International Shoe Court’s 
innovative contribution to the law of personal jurisdiction was to make 
clear that fictions—like the defendant’s voluntary submission to the 
authority of the sovereign—should be abandoned in favor of a realistic 
approach.172 
C. Standing 
The Court described the key elements of the doctrine of standing in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of 
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
                                                                                                             
 168 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 169 Id. at 883. 
 170 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 171 See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877. 
 172 Along these lines, see Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in McIntyre (“Finally, 
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particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not 
the result of the independent action of some third party not before 
the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.173 
If we examine the basic elements of standing—injury, causation, and 
redressability—though, we see that they do no more than describe the 
elements of a claim.  Thus, a plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for lack 
of standing if it doesn’t pass the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss-for-
failure-to-state-a-claim muster; and it should not be dismissed on those 
grounds when it is legally sufficient.174  But this has not always been the 
case, and some of the Court’s opinions that depart from this idea are hard 
to reconcile with due process, as the synthesis of conflicting interests that 
they are premised on discount the rights of the plaintiffs and the interest 
of the judicial system in providing federal courts for the vindication of 
federal rights. 
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,175 the plaintiff sought to establish the 
unconstitutionality of a state child-support law that had been interpreted 
as not being enforceable against fathers of children born out of wedlock.  
The plaintiff sought an order that would preclude the state from denying 
enforcement of those laws solely on the basis of the father’s unmarried 
status.  But she ultimately wanted the father of her child to pay child 
support.176  The Court focused on the probability of success of this ultimate 
“remedy” to show that her claim was not redressable since it was not clear 
that the father would pay that support even if the law were enforced against 
him.177  But had the Court attended to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim, 
it would have realized that the plaintiff had asserted a well-recognized 
right of action—the equal enforcement of the laws—that, if meritorious, 
                                                                                                             
 173 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 174 I more extensively examine the idea of standing analysis as a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis 
in The Claim, supra note 10. See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
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 175 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
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would entitle her to relief, namely, a wedlock-neutral application of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Clapper v. Amnesty In’l178 is equally problematic. In Clapper, 
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations sued, 
among others, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
General, seeking a declaration that the provision of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) allowing surveillance of individuals who were 
not “United States persons” and were reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States, was unconstitutional, as well as an injunction 
against surveillance authorized by the provision.179 
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate standing, essentially because the 
future injury they feared—surveillance—was not “certainly impending,” 
and it was not fairly traceable to the FSIA provision at issue.180  In tracing 
the contours of the modern standing theory, the Court observed that “it is 
no surprise that respondents fail to offer any evidence that their 
communications have been monitored under §1881a, a failure that 
substantially undermines their standing theory;”181 and that “respondents 
in the present case present no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, 
but instead rest on mere conjecture about possible governmental 
actions.”182  One, though, wonders how realistically could the plaintiffs 
have offered evidence that their conversations had been monitored, and 
whether asking for evidence at the pleading stage is consistent with the 
Rules, the jurisprudence interpreting them, and the very idea of litigation 
as a process that through discovery and dispositive motions, resolves 
disputes and provides the stage for the enforcement of rights and the 
development of substantive law. 
Again, the individual’s rights as well as the interest of the system in 
providing a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights were not 
factored in, or if they were, they were not adequately factored.  And, in 
any event, given that the due process balance engaged in by the Court, if 
any at all, was not articulated in the opinion, the opinion doesn’t meet the 
most fundamental due process and democratic aspirations. 
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D. Pleadings 
Federal Rule of Civil Proceduire 8(a)(2) provides that “[a] pleading 
that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”183  If the 
complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2), the defendant will be able 
to successfully move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss it for “failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.”184 
Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) were meant to operate in the “notice 
pleading” system, a system where pleadings are intended to open the doors 
to discovery with minimal considerations of the claim asserted.185  The 
idea was that the factual and legal sufficiency of the claim would be 
examined after discovery, on a motion for summary judgment, that is, after 
the facts and theories supportive of the claim could be fully developed 
through an open exchange of information between the parties.186  Forcing 
the text and the spirit of Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), though, Bell Atlantic 
v. Twombly187 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal188 created a new pleading regime 
described as “plausibility pleading.”  The current pleading standard 
focuses formalistically on the cause of action and not on the general nature 
of the claim, and the claim is easily extinguished before being fully 
examined.189 
Both Twombly and Iqbal’s complaints would have survived the Rule 
12(b)(6) muster in the notice pleading regime preceding Twombly and 
Iqbal.  And that makes sense.  At the beginning of the litigation the 
plaintiff does not have access to all the information necessary to prevail 
on the merits.  And yet, unless the plaintiff’s claim “strike[s] a savvy judge 
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very 
remote and unlikely,’”190 the complaint may proceed to discovery.  But 
despite the apparent Twombly and Iqbal Courts’ adherence to this original 
notice pleading idea, the Twombly Court found the plaintiffs’ complaint 
under §1 of the Sherman Act191 insufficient because plaintiffs’ allegations 
of parallel conduct and of some other reasons for not competing were not 
sufficient, as plaintiffs had not ruled out other valid alternatives for not 
competing.192 And similarly, the Iqbal Court found that the plaintiff’s 
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allegations of defendants’ intent to discriminate against him because of his 
race and religion not sufficient as there might be “other neutral, 
investigative reason” for the disparate treatment193 that the plaintiff had 
not ruled out.194 
What was the balance of interests analysis that the Court engaged in 
when deciding to discard plaintiffs’ rights?  Assuming those plaintiffs’ 
rights were factored in, was the interest of the judicial system in providing 
a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights—those arising from 
the Sherman Act and those arising in the context of a Bivens action195—
considered?  And if the judicial system’s interest was considered, and the 
national security interests prevailed over the interest in making a federal 
forum available, was elevating the pleading standard the best method to 
meet this prevailing national security interest?196  And what about the 
consequences of both opinions—an antitrust case, and a national security 
case—on future cases?  Where those consequences considered?  After all, 
the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard is supposed to apply to a wide range 
of cases.197 
Twombly and Iqbal hardly meet the due process aspirations of a 
democratic judicial system. 
E. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19, 23, and 26 
Rule 19(a) provides that persons “required” to be joined—to accord 
complete relief to the existing parties, or properly protect the absent 
parties’ interest, or avoid a risk of double, multiple or inconsistent 
obligations for the existing parties—should be joined if feasible, that is, 
they should be joined if the court would have personal jurisdiction and 
subject matter jurisdiction over them.198  If the joinder of such required 
persons is not feasible, Rule 19(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors 
that a court might balance when determining “whether, in equity and good 
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conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should 
be dismissed.”199 
Rule 19(b) factors mirror the Rule 19(a) factors.  But the Rule 19(b)’s 
spectrum is broader than those of Rule 19(a) and seems to demand a due 
process analysis of the joinder mechanism and its operation by calling for 
a realistic appraisal of the specific facts of the case, and a balance of the 
various and conflicting interests.200 
The Supreme Court examined the mechanics of Rule 19201 in 
Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel.202  In Pimentel, a stakeholder filed an 
interpleader action against several claimants—including the Republic of 
the Philippines (“the Republic”) and the Philippine Presidential 
Commission (“the Commission”)—that were claiming an interest in the 
stake, i.e., the property allegedly stolen by Ferdinand Marcos when he was 
President of the Philippines.203  The Republic and Commission invoked 
sovereign immunity and were dismissed from the action, but the action 
proceeded to judgment over their objection.204  They contended that the 
action should have been dismissed as they were indispensable parties 
under Rule 19.205  The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the 
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action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission.206  The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to order the 
district court to dismiss the action.207  Without engaging in Rule 19(a)208 
or Rule 19(b) analysis,209 the Court essentially resolved the joinder 
question on comity and sovereign immunity grounds,210 denying the 
plaintiffs access to justice.  Had the Court attended to the text of Rule 19 
and the due process analysis demanded by the rule, the result might have 
been different.  But even if the result, determined by political reasons, 
would have still been the same, the opinion would have rested on more 
solid due process foundations. 
Differently from Rule 19, Rule 23211 governing class actions can 
hardly be considered a model of due process.  Rule 23 was adopted to 
allow joinder of parties where such parties’ claims couldn’t be litigated 
individually (because of the related costs), or where it would be 
impractical to rely on other joinder devices to litigate such claims (because 
of the number of individuals with claims to be joined).  In other words, 
without class actions there would be no way to litigate these claims, either 
individually or through standard rules on joinder.212 So conceived, Rule 23 
should have required just a simple and elegant joinder analysis, conducive 
of the final result of aggregation whenever that would be feasible and fair.  
But the Rule now contains a series of narrow and rigid multipart formulas 
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that make aggregation hard to achieve and at times seem to favor the 
party(ies) resisting class certification.213 
For an action to be certified as a class, Rule 23(a) provides that there 
must be (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy 
of representation.214  A class may proceed as such if it meets all the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and falls within one of the three types under 
Rule 23(b).215 
Under Rule 23(a), the proposed class must be “so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable;”216 there must be “questions of 
law or fact common to the class;”217 the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class;”218 and the representative parties must “fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class.”219  Under Rule 23(b), the action should fall into 
one of the three “types”220 listed in that rule: “(1) . . . prosecuting separate 
actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of (A) 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class;221 or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a 
practical  matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members 
not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests;”222 (2) “the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respective the class as a whole;”223 or (3) “the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
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superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”224 
The (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2) classes are “mandatory,”225 
meaning that the Rule does not entitle class members to notice of class 
certification or the right to opt out of the class.226  The (b)(3) class, 
however, is an “opt-out” class, as class members have the right to notice 
of class certification and the right to opt-out of the class.227 
The text of the Rule is hyper-technical, also containing provisions on 
the “Certification Order; Notice to Class Members; Judgment; Issues 
Classes; Subclasses,”228 “Conducting the Action,”229 “Settlement, 
Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise,”230 “Appeals,”231 and “Class 
Counsel.”232 
Because of the technicalities and the several redundancies in the 
Rule, when applying it, courts tend to look for something else, something 
that would satisfy the redundant requirement and give an independent 
meaning to it.  In search for this independent meaning, judges often make 
ad-hoc, anti-plaintiffs considerations that elevate formality over 
substance, frontload the analysis of the merits,233 close the doors of federal 
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Process Require Notice and Opt-Out Rights? 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 809 (2014). 
 227 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring, in (b)(3) classes, “the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances,” which must also state that “the court will exclude 
from the class any member who requests exclusion.”). 
 228 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
 229 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). 
 230 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 231 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 232 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 233 In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court even suggested that expert witnesses offered for 
purposes of certification must be qualified under the Federal Rules of Evidence and after a 
full Daubert hearing. 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011). 
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courts by increasing the procedural hurdles,234 increase the costs of 
litigation,235 and ultimately short-circuit the class action joinder 
mechanism. 236  As I said, hardly a model of due process. 
Rule 26237 governing discovery, although not as fraught with 
formalities as Rule 23, has endorsed a mechanical model that might at 
some point turn into the Rule 23 model. 
Typically, discovery commences after the pleading stage of a 
controversy.  The original Rules allowed discovery under a “subject 
matter” standard.  Hence, a party was entitled to discover any 
nonprivileged factual material relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.  
Thus, the standard, a more generalized one, was not focused on the claim, 
but on the subject matter of the suit.  This distinction reflected the fact that 
the claim was inchoate when discovery commenced since only its broad 
nature had to be revealed under the original interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2).  
Discovery on the inchoate claim could either broaden or narrow the actual 
claim to be litigated.238 
The version of Rule 26(b) adopted in 2000 defined the scope of 
discovery in terms of information relevant to a “claim or defense,” a 
conceptually narrower category than subject matter.239  But if the claim is 
                                                                                                             
 234 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Inaugural University Professorship Lecture: Are They 
Closing the Courthouse Doors? (Mar. 19, 2012) (www.law.nyu/edu/news/
ECM_PRO_072088) at 7 (“The class certification motion thus has become another 
procedural stop sign undermining the utility of one of the most important joinder 
mechanisms for handling disputes arising from conduct damaging large numbers of people 
with small claims.”). 
 235 Id. (“If class representatives cannot clear the certification hurdle, as has become 
more common, individual actions are not pursued because they are not economically 
viable. Even when an attempt to block certification doesn’t succeed, the very elaborate 
process created by the courts imposes additional cost and delay, especially when 
interlocutory appellate review of certification is sought, let alone granted. Perhaps even 
more troublesome is the fact that increased costs and the heightened risk of non-
certification inhibits the institution of potentially meritorious cases, leaving public policies 
under enforced and large numbers of citizens uncompensated.”). See also Freer, Front-
Loading, supra note 7, at 723 (“This front-loading increases the expense of litigating class 
certification. More is on the table at an early stage than in prior practice.”). 
 236 See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal 
Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 
1740 (2014). 
 237 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 238 The current approach is less generous. Under Twombly and Iqbal, the claim must be 
defended as to each right of action, by aligning the non-conclusory factual allegations with 
each element of a specified right. Only after this standard is satisfied will discovery 
commence. 
 239 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, 
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the 
court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
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a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more rights of action, there 
cannot be any matter that, although not relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense will be still relevant to the subject matter.  Indeed, judges have 
noted that the 2000 amendment did not materially alter their task.240  The 
goal, however, was to “involve the court more actively in regulating the 
breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.”241 
Rule 26(b) was again amended in 2015 to further limit the scope of 
discovery, and it now provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to 
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not 
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.242 
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment explained 
that, 
[t]he amendment deletes the former provision authorizing the 
court, for good cause, to order discovery of any matter relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the action. The Committee has been 
informed that this language is rarely invoked. Proportional 
discovery relevant to any party’s claim or defense suffices, given 
a proper understanding of what is relevant to a claim or defense. 
The distinction between matter relevant to a claim or defense and 
matter relevant to the subject matter was introduced in 2000 . . . . 
Discovery that is relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses may 
also support amendment of the pleadings to add a new claim or 
defense that affects the scope of discovery.243 
The new text reads more like a mechanical code provision, and my 
fear is that it will generate further litigation over forms and technicalities 
and that the proportionality standards will work in tandem with Twombly 
and Iqbal to narrow the range of discovery to those rights of action that 
                                                                                                             
action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is 
subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”). 
 240 See, e.g. Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 232 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. 
Conn. 2005); Klein v. AIG Trading Group Inc., 228 F.R.D. 418, 423 (D. Conn. 2005); 
Lugosch v. Congel, 218 F.R.D. 41, 45 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). 
 241 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Note (2000). 
 242 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
 243 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) Advisory Committee’s note (2015). 
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survive a court’s application of Rule 12(b)(6),244 thus frustrating the 
important due process aspirations that discovery is intended to meet. 
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
When procedural rules and doctrines stray from due process, they 
prevent the development and enforcement of substantive rights. 
The interpretation and application of the patent law experimental use 
exception demanded that the federal court hear the Gunn case.  The 
development of patent law was thus frustrated by the unjustified denial of 
subject matter jurisdiction in that case.  Similarly, the denial of personal 
jurisdiction in McIntyre prevented the court from engaging in the 
assessment of the manufacturer’s liability under the circumstances of the 
case and, even more troublesome, essentially evaporated the possibility for 
the plaintiff to enforce his rights.  The Court did not assess the equal 
protection of the laws claim that the plaintiff had filed in Linda R.S., and 
in Clapper, it refused to interpret and apply the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).  The law of the Sherman Act was not clarified in 
Twombly, and the plaintiffs were prevented from trying to enforce their 
substantive rights that they “plausibly” believed arose from that Act.  The 
plaintiff in Iqbal was denied the same possibility, and similar treatment 
received the plaintiffs in Pimentel.  The mechanical, check-list style of 
Rules 23 and 26 might generate similar results. 
Many other procedural rules and doctrines cannot be squared with 
due process. The findings and reflections of this study are intended to 
provide a platform against which to test those rules and doctrines for 
purposes of reform, a reform of their text, of their interpretation, and/or of 
the way we think about them. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Procedure and law are more deeply intertwined that one might think. 
Procedure is the means and method through which substantive law is 
enforced and developed.  Thus the optimal development of substantive law 
requires an optimal procedure which, as I have shown, is a procedure 
consistent and informed by due process. 
Starting from the fragmented ideas provided by the Supreme Court 
over the years, and moving to deeper, more holistic reflections on the 
common law and democratic system within which those ideas are 
supposed to operate, this study develops a theory of due process that will 
hopefully prompt further reflections and support for reform. 
                                                                                                             
 244 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra 
note 10. 
